Saudi Arabia–Türkiye Defence Industry Relations: From Licence to Co-Production (2017–2026)

The Saudi Arabia–Türkiye defence industry line is a first in this series: it opened not with a product sale but with a licence. The Karayel-SU licence signed in Dubai in 2017 turned into production in the Kingdom in 2021; the 2023 AKINCI contract came with a commitment of up to 70% local content; in 2025 three Turkish companies signed technology-transfer agreements for land systems. This file reads nine years in one table and writes every item with its status.

This is the series’ third bilateral file. Saudi Arabia’s AKINCI decision was examined in the second file as a single procurement; that data is not repeated. What is added is the rest: the Karayel licence, the localisation agreements, SAMI’s memoranda, the land-systems complex, the KAAN talks and the Mecca Pact. The pattern set in the Pakistan and Poland files applies: contract, memorandum, talks and statement are written apart. The Turkish original is here.

Short answer: opened by a licence, deepened by local share

None of the nineteen files before this one began with a licence. In the Gulf, Qatar and Kuwait bought finished systems; the Balkans were donations and small fleets; Poland deepened through subsystem integration. The Saudi line opened in 2017 when a Turkish company (Vestel Savunma, now Lentatek) licensed a Saudi company (Intra Defense Technologies) to build a tactical armed drone, and in 2021 Intra and AEC actually started building it. Six years later the AKINCI contract carried the same logic into the heavy MALE class: sale plus up to 70% local content. In 2025 technology-transfer agreements with Nurol Makina, FNSS and Aselsan extended it to land systems. The line climbed three rungs: licence → local share → local complex. That is the new component this file adds to the Turkish package: the localisation ladder.

Three things the table says. Six of nine items involve localisation or technology transfer: the line is about building industry more than selling products. The Turkish side has six companies; the Saudi side is almost a single entity, SAMI and its subsidiaries. And unlike Pakistan and Poland there is no reverse flow; what flows back is production scale, not product.

What did Saudi Arabia need?

Saudi Arabia holds one of the world’s largest defence budgets and the largest in the Middle East; its inventory is American, European and, over the last decade, Chinese. Vision 2030’s defence target is a single sentence: localise 50% of spending by the end of the decade. That target gained an institutional tool in 2017 when the Public Investment Fund founded SAMI. The need was therefore never only “which system” but “which system, with what local share” — and the Turkish line answered that question in a way no other buyer in the series received. The Karayel licence was the first trial in 2017; AKINCI scaled it up in 2023; land systems took it beyond drones in 2025.

Karayel-SU: the line that began with a licence

At the Dubai Airshow in November 2017 Vestel Savunma and Intra Defense Technologies signed a contract for licensed production of the Karayel-SU in Saudi Arabia. In March 2021 Intra and the Advanced Electronics Company (AEC) began production, AEC supplying electronics and Vestel the critical components. Intra announced a batch of 40 aircraft for 2021–2025; in Saudi service the aircraft is reported under the name Haboob. At WDS in Riyadh in February 2026 Intra displayed the Karayel with the locally developed Shalfa guided munition and said most of the munition’s manufacturing content was being localised in the Kingdom. Lentatek’s licence route is the quiet branch of Turkish drone exports outside Baykar and TUSAŞ, and the only case in the series where licence came before product.

AKINCI: a sale plus seventy percent

The AKINCI contract signed on 18 July 2023 during President Erdoğan’s visit to Jeddah was described by Baykar as the largest defence and aerospace export contract in the history of the Turkish Republic; quantity and value were not officially disclosed, and international press reported roughly $3 billion. The reasoning — endurance, munition independence, a closed US line — is in the second file. This file’s subject is what came nineteen days later, on 6 August 2023: SAMI–Baykar (airframe structures, electrical systems, ground equipment, final assembly, integration, testing and maintenance), NCMS–Aselsan (electro-optical surveillance and targeting) and NCMS–Roketsan (guidance kits and guided munitions), with a target of up to 70% local content. On 13 October 2025 the first Saudi operators graduated at Çorlu; Baykar has said production lines are being set up, with no date yet for the first local assembly. The AKINCI–MQ-9B comparison shows where the class sits.

SAMI: one buyer, six Turkish companies

The Saudi counterpart on almost every item is the same: SAMI or its subsidiaries (NCMS, SAMI Land). In July 2024 in Riyadh, with Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman witnessing, SAMI signed three memoranda: with Baykar on UAV manufacturing capability and intellectual-property transfer, with Fergani Space on a centre of excellence for space technologies, with Aselsan on localising advanced electronics. All three are memoranda; no contract has been announced, and the file writes them as such. But the three signatures show the line’s direction of growth — from drones into space and electronics. Among Aselsan’s export markets Saudi Arabia now appears on three separate lines: AKINCI subsystems, land turrets and electronics.

Land systems: SLIC and three agreements

At IDEF in Istanbul on 24 July 2025 SAMI Land signed technology-transfer agreements with three Turkish companies: Nurol Makina for military vehicle production, FNSS for armoured combat vehicles and weapon turrets, Aselsan for local manufacture of combat turret systems. Turkey’s SSB president Haluk Görgün and GAMI governor Ahmed Al-Ohali attended. Production is planned at the SAMI Land Industrial Complex (SLIC), due to open in the fourth quarter of 2025: 4×4, 6×6 and 8×8 armoured vehicles and armed turrets. Quantities and values were not disclosed. Turkish armoured vehicles sold as finished products in the Balkans and Africa are here transferred as production technology; unlike the Romanian joint venture, the line is built under the roof of the Saudi complex rather than the Turkish company.

Why no price is written

There is not a single official value in this file. Neither side disclosed the AKINCI contract value; the Karayel licence, the SAMI Land agreements and the memoranda are equally undisclosed. Local share is one reason: part of the value goes not to the Turkish company but to the Saudi production line, and the two accounts are separate. The file therefore makes no unit-price comparison with the Kuwaiti and Qatari packages, and the cost-effectiveness score reflects that uncertainty.

Training and munitions

Training runs on two levels: operator training in Türkiye (first graduation 13 October 2025, Çorlu) and production training in Saudi Arabia under the test-and-maintenance clause of the SAMI–Baykar agreement. Munitions are an upgraded version of the series’ most repeated component, “munitions in the same package”: the Roketsan–NCMS agreement provides for producing guidance kits and guided munitions in the Kingdom, and on the Karayel line Intra developed its own Shalfa munition. The third-country licence problem thus disappears not only in sale but in production. The munition-integration model that turned the TB2 into an export product has, on the Saudi line, become local munition production.

Alternatives and complements

The row to read is the second: Saudi Arabia added the Turkish line beside the Chinese one, not in its place. CH-4 has been in service since 2014 and a Wing Loong II local-assembly deal dates from 2017; AKINCI arrived in 2023. The dual-sourcing pattern seen in Africa applies here at larger scale, and the file makes no superiority claim. Air defence is entirely a US line — Patriot and THAAD — and the SİPER–Patriot comparison shows where the Turkish offer stands in that segment, but there is no air-defence item on the Saudi line. Analysts discussed KORKUT and HİSAR-O after the Mecca Pact; the file records that as analysis, not as an item.

KAAN: talks, not a contract

Saudi talks on KAAN have been public since 2025. TUSAŞ general manager Mehmet Demiroğlu said in February 2026 that they were in their final stages; President Erdoğan said on 5 February 2026 that they continued. The press reported quantities and a production line; this file writes neither. If the talks become a contract, the Saudi line would carry the series’ first fighter export and KAAN’s place in the fifth-generation class would open a new comparison in the Gulf — as the Egypt discussion already does in Africa. If not, the line stays where it is, in drones and land systems. The file makes no forecast.

The Saudi version of the Turkish package

In the Gulf we counted four components: record, munitions, permission and production share. The Balkans added donation and in-alliance reference, Central Asia the full catalogue, Pakistan the buyer’s shipyard and reverse flow, Poland subsystem integration and alliance logistics. The Saudi line adds one component and enlarges another: the localisation ladder and one buyer, many companies.

The localisation ladder

Production share appeared only on the Saudi row of the Gulf file; this file shows that row has three rungs. First rung, licence (Karayel-SU, 2017): the Turkish company gives the design, the Saudi company builds. Second rung, local share (AKINCI, 2023): the Turkish company sells the product, up to 70% of airframe and subsystems are built in the Kingdom, and three Turkish primes sign separately with three Saudi partners. Third rung, complex (SAMI Land, 2025): Turkish companies transfer technology and production happens under the roof of a Saudi complex. The difference from Indonesia’s co-development and Pakistan’s buyer shipyard is that every rung on the Saudi side connects to a single industrial builder.

One buyer, many companies

On the Turkish side: Baykar, Lentatek, Aselsan, Roketsan, Nurol Makina, FNSS and, at talks stage, TUSAŞ. On the Saudi side: SAMI, NCMS, SAMI Land, Intra and AEC — all tied to the Vision 2030 localisation goal. This differs from the UAE, which enters the Turkish sector as an investor; Saudi Arabia enters as a producer. The “permission from a single capital” component seen in Central Asia applies here too, with local-production permission on top: Türkiye is the party allowing its own product to be built in another country.

What changed in nine years?

The timeline shows three phases: 2017–2021 licence and production start, 2023 AKINCI and the localisation agreements, 2024–2026 memoranda, land systems and a framework agreement. The turning point is 2023: a main contract and three localisation agreements within nineteen days.

What is official and what is in talks

The table shows where the next rung lies: if the KAAN talks and the Mecca Pact’s industry clause become contracts, the Saudi line moves from drones and land systems to fighters. Today both are talks and framework; the pact’s industrial dimension is on analysts’ agenda and its deterrence clause is being tested by regional events.

EM-PFI assessment

The score assesses the whole relationship, not one contract. The AKINCI decision was scored separately in the second file; the whole relationship — Karayel licence, SAMI Land agreements, munition production — sits in the series’ upper band on technology transfer and local production.

The breakdown inverts the series’ backbone: most files showed fast delivery and low industrial share; here industrial share is high and delivery and cost less certain. It is the mirror image of Poland: integration without production there, production without alliance logistics here.

Risks and limits

This section exists not to weaken the Turkish product but to make the file usable.

Where is this line going?

Back to the opening definition: a line opened by a licence and deepened by local share. Saudi Arabia took from Turkish industry what the US and Chinese lines did not give — permission to build locally. The Karayel licence, AKINCI’s 70%, the land-systems complex: three versions of the same sentence. In return Turkish companies gained production scale in the country with the Gulf’s largest budget and a reference in one of the region’s strongest militaries. No other line in the series carries so high a local-share commitment; Pakistan is deeper through joint design and Poland more bound through alliance logistics, but neither is as production-centred. Nine items in nine years, six Turkish companies and a one-way flow: that is the line’s measure.

The next rung depends on two items: the KAAN talks becoming a contract and the Mecca Pact’s industry clause becoming working groups and production lines. If both do, the Saudi line carries the series’ first fighter export; if not, it stays as it is — licence, local share, complex — and that is already an upper rung. WDS 2028 and the first locally assembled AKINCI are the places to watch. This file wrote only what was signed or entered production.

Reading the line from Washington and Beijing

For a reader who follows the US and Chinese lines into the Gulf, the Saudi–Turkish line is neither a replacement nor a rival. The US line holds the main platforms — fighters, air defence, heavy armour — and the MQ-9 was never cleared for the Kingdom. The Chinese line filled the armed-drone gap from 2014 with CH-4 and, from 2017, Wing Loong II local assembly, but with limited local content. The Turkish line entered where the other two left room: a licensed tactical drone, a heavy MALE with a 70% local-share commitment and, from 2025, land-systems technology transfer. Three lines coexist in one inventory, each in its own segment, and this file makes no claim about which is superior. The one sentence to take away: the Saudi line is the only case in the series where Turkish industry sold a country not a product but permission to produce — beginning with a licence and continuing with a percentage.

Frequently asked questions

Other files in the series

The “Why They Chose the Turkish Defence Industry” series goes beyond individual export headlines to examine the buyer’s need, the alternatives on the table and the contract structure.

• Why do Gulf states choose Turkish drones?
• Why is the Turkish defence industry growing in the Balkans?
• Why are Central Asian states turning to Turkish drones?
• Pakistan–Türkiye defence industry relations
• Poland–Türkiye defence industry relations

The full series and regional breakdowns are on the Türkiye defence exports hub (Turkish).

Sources and method

• Baykar statements — Saudi AKINCI contract (18 July 2023); localisation agreement with SAMI (6 August 2023); first Saudi operators’ graduation (13 October 2025)
• SAMI statements — NCMS–Aselsan and NCMS–Roketsan agreements (6 August 2023); memoranda with Baykar, Fergani Space and Aselsan (July 2024); SAMI Land agreements with Nurol Makina, FNSS and Aselsan (IDEF, 24 July 2025)
• Vestel Savunma / Lentatek and Intra Defense Technologies statements — Karayel-SU licence contract (Dubai Airshow, November 2017); production start and 40-aircraft batch (March 2021); WDS 2026 Shalfa display
• TUSAŞ and Turkish Presidency statements — KAAN talks (February 2026)
• Turkish, Saudi and Pakistani government statements — Mecca Pact (7 August 2026)
• Saudi Vision 2030 documents — 50% localisation target; SAMI founding (2017)
• SIPRI, March 2026 — Türkiye’s export ranking and recipients
• International defence press — items at talks or statement status marked in the tables

Method note. Every item is written with its status — contract, agreement, memorandum, talks, statement; memoranda and talks are not presented as contracts. AKINCI quantity and value are undisclosed and therefore not written; the press figure is marked as press. The Karayel-SU quantity rests on an Intra statement and the Haboob name on press reports. The Chinese line is written as a coexisting line, not a rival; no superiority claim. The Mecca Pact is written as a framework with no forecast of its industrial effect. EM-PFI is Envanter Medya’s editorial assessment, not an official index.