How to Counter Kamikaze Drones: A Guide to Layered Defence

Distinguishing the threat classes is essential

Not every kamikaze/UAV threat is the same. Before building a defensive architecture, the class of the
threat must be identified:

• FPV kamikaze drone: short range, very low cost, operator-controlled, very low altitude,
  high manoeuvrability, can change direction at the last moment.
• One-way attack UAV: long range, pre-programmed route, GNSS/INS navigation, larger
  warhead, used against critical infrastructure, potential for wave attacks.
• Loitering munition: loiters over the target area, merges reconnaissance and strike,
  operator or autonomous target selection.
• Mini/micro UAV: reconnaissance, target acquisition, fire correction, small munition
  drops.
• Drone swarm: many low-cost targets, saturation of defences, distributed/multi-axis
  approach, semi-autonomous or networked.

Cost classes are relative bands based on publicly available general information, not verified unit prices.

The problem is usually detection, not the kill

With small UAV/drone threats the weakest link is early and accurate detection. No single sensor type is
enough; radar, RF direction-finding, electro-optical/thermal cameras and acoustic sensors must be fused into
one command network (sensor fusion).

Soft-kill and hard-kill: different tools for different threats

Soft-kill methods (RF/GNSS jamming, cyber-protocol intervention) do not expend munitions but can be
limited against drones using autonomous navigation. Hard-kill methods (programmable gun ammunition,
interceptor drones, laser, missile) neutralise physically but are constrained by cost and ammunition.

The cost-exchange ratio

Firing an expensive missile at a cheap drone may look uneconomical at first glance; but if the value of
the protected asset (aircraft, radar, air-defence battery, power plant, command centre, personnel) is very
high, that choice can still be operationally correct. So the decision must not be reduced to “the drone is
cheap, the missile is expensive.” Questions to weigh:

• What is the approximate cost class of the attacking drone and the interceptor used?
• How many munitions/shots per target, and how many targets can arrive in one wave?
• How many targets can the system engage simultaneously, and how fast is ammunition replenished?
• What is the value of the facility/system/personnel being protected?

The bars above are not exact prices; they are a qualitative comparison of relative cost magnitude.

The Turkish defence industry’s counter-UAS ecosystem

The distinct advantage of the Turkish defence industry comes not from a single product but from the
ability to develop the radar, electro-optical, electronic-warfare, command-and-control, programmable
munition, laser, missile and interceptor-drone layers within the same ecosystem.

• ASELSAN İHTAR family: a modular architecture that detects mini/micro UAVs with radar and
  electro-optical/thermal sensors, performs automatic tracking and applies directional or omnidirectional
  jamming. İHTAR 100’s open architecture is presented as suitable for integration with the GÖKBERK laser
  system, the ŞAHİN 40 mm hard-kill system and various weapon systems.
• ŞAHİN 40 mm: a hard-kill layer against mini and micro UAV targets using
  programmable/airburst ammunition, at a lower per-shot cost than missiles.
• GÖKBERK laser system: a directed-energy solution with electro-optical tracking and low
  per-shot cost; it has technical limitations such as energy/cooling needs and weather dependency.
• ROKETSAN ALKA: a two-layer directed-energy system combining electromagnetic jamming with
  laser destruction, positioned for close-in and asymmetric threats.
• HİSAR family: an air-defence missile system aimed at protecting critical facilities
  against fixed/rotary-wing aircraft, cruise missiles and UAV threats; it is not a default solution against
  low-cost micro drones but a last layer for larger/higher-risk targets.
• Drone hunter (drone-vs-drone): the SSB’s 2026 requests for information define
  interceptor/hunter UAV systems that physically engage NATO Class 1-2 and mini/micro/tactical UAV threats as
  a priority need, signalling a move toward a cost-effective, mobile interception layer.

A conceptual comparison with international systems

US interceptor-drone programmes (Coyote-type systems), European short-range C-UAS systems, German
gun-based solutions, Israeli laser/jammer systems, British directed-energy projects and mobile interception
systems used on the ground in Ukraine all follow a similar logic: combining sensor, soft-kill and hard-kill
layers. NATO’s counter-UAS exercises likewise focus on the interoperability of radar, electro-optical
sensors, jammers, interceptor drones and different effectors.

Rather than declaring anything “cheaper” without verified price data, a more accurate statement is: having
the gun, electronic-warfare and laser layers reduce missile usage can provide a potential life-cycle cost
advantage. The standout feature of the Turkish defence industry is its ability to develop a broad product
family from sensor to effector within one ecosystem, with domestic production and fast user feedback.

New technology proposals (defensive purpose)

1. National counter-UAS sensor network: fusing low-cost radar, RF direction-finding,
   acoustic and EO/IR sensors with AI-assisted classification into a single command-and-control network.
2. Interceptor drone family: micro interceptor, fast FPV interceptor, long-endurance patrol
   interceptor, net-firing catcher and reusable hunter-drone variants.
3. Vehicle-mounted compact C-UAS package: combining a mini radar, RF sensor, EO/IR,
   directional jammer and remote weapon station on a single platform.
4. High-power microwave layer: a layer that complements the laser and can affect multiple
   electronic targets simultaneously against swarms.
5. AI-assisted engagement manager: a decision-support system that proposes jam/track/send
   interceptor/use gun/use laser/use missile while preserving human authorisation.
6. Decoy and electromagnetic deception network: cheap false radar/heat signatures to steer
   the attacking drone toward a low-value area.
7. Physical-protection standard around critical facilities: modular netting, overhead
   protection, stand-off distance, separate redundant systems and rapid repair kits.
8. Counter-UAS munition family: programmable airburst ammunition, low-cost mini
   interceptors and smart fuzes driven by sensor fusion.
9. Digital twin and continuous exercises: drone-wave simulation, sensor blind-spot
   measurement and operator training on a digital model of bases.
10. Quarterly rapid development cycle: as in NATO’s layered counter-UAS initiative — scan the
    threat, build a prototype, test in the field, integrate, gather feedback, release a new version within three
    months.

Proposed layered architecture

The most expensive effector should be used last. First contact should, as far as possible, be made with
electronic warfare, interceptor drones, programmable munitions and directed energy; short-range missiles
should be reserved as the last layer only for large, fast or high-warhead threats making a final approach on
a critical asset.

Solution by protected asset

Priority order by threat

Counter-UAS Cost-Effectiveness Index (Envanter Medya editorial assessment)

The weighting below is not an exact military success rate but a qualitative editorial framework that can
be used when selecting systems.