ANALYSIS – Is Russia finished? War economy, demographics and a shrinking sphere of influence

[Asaf Türk writes defense and security analysis for Envanter Medya.]
On October 23, the Bank of Russia held its key rate at 14 percent, raised its 2026 inflation forecast to 7.1–7.6 percent and narrowed its full-year growth estimate to 0.5–1 percent. Those three numbers capture the real question about Russia as the war that began in February 2022 enters its fifth year: the economy has not collapsed, but it is no longer growing either. The answer to “Is Russia finished?” sits somewhere between those two facts.
The question matters because the answer shapes Black Sea security, the balance in the Caucasus and the careful calibration Türkiye maintains between the West and Russia. Those who argue that Russia is in decline rest their case on four pillars: a stalling war economy, human losses layered on poor demographics, a shrinking sphere of influence abroad and growing dependence on China. The opposing case can be summed up in one word: resilience.
The limits of military Keynesianism
Contrary to most forecasts, the Russian economy grew in the first two years of the war: 3.6 percent in 2023 and 4.3 percent in 2024, according to Rosstat. The engine was the arms industry. In the 2026 federal budget, defense and domestic security account for roughly 38 percent of total spending, or 16.8 trillion rubles. SIPRI puts 2025 military expenditure at 7.5 percent of GDP.
The problem is that this model has a saturation point. As resources flowed into the defense sector, civilian industries contracted. Unemployment fell to record lows, but that is a symptom of labor shortage rather than a success. In early November the central bank wrote that the economy had re-entered “overheating” territory in the third quarter. The fiscal picture is harsher: oil and gas revenues fell 45 percent in the first quarter of 2026, the annual deficit target was exceeded within three months and the government raised value-added tax from 20 to 22 percent. Higher oil prices after the Israeli and U.S. war on Iran in early 2026 gave Moscow breathing room, but that relief came from events outside Russia’s control.
The most debated issue is the cost of peace. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers at the front and factories running on war orders will not find the same demand after a ceasefire. That is why the argument that Russia can finance war but will struggle to finance the transition to peace is taken seriously.
Refineries, gas and the single-buyer problem
Ukraine’s drone strikes on Russian refineries have been systematic since 2025. According to Reuters, citing industry sources, about 30 percent of operational refining capacity has been disrupted since late October; Kyiv puts the figure above 55 percent. Russia has restricted fuel exports to protect the domestic market and shifted toward selling crude. CREA data show that since February 2023, 50 percent of Russian crude exports went to China and 37 percent to India. In October 2026, 60 percent of Russia’s seaborne oil was carried by sanctioned “shadow fleet” tankers.
The break in gas is more permanent. According to the European Commission, Russia’s share of EU gas imports fell from 45 percent in 2022 to 12 percent in 2025, and an EU regulation in force since February 2026 sets a full ban on Russian gas by November 2027 at the latest. Having lost its Western market, Gazprom’s only large alternative is China, and Beijing knows it. Talks on the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline stayed deadlocked on price throughout 2026, with China reportedly seeking a tariff close to Russian domestic prices. A seller forced to rely on a single customer does not set the price.
The front, the losses and the population
The independent Russian outlet Mediazona had confirmed by name about 286,000 Russian military deaths from open sources as of November 6, 2026, including 7,983 officers. Mediazona itself stresses that the real toll is higher. According to DeepState’s map, Russia controlled about 19 percent of Ukraine’s territory at the end of October. Kostiantynivka, the gateway to Donetsk’s “fortress belt”, has not fallen despite more than a year of assaults; ISW assesses that Moscow wants a local ceasefire there to mass forces. Russia’s long-range capacity to destroy remains high, while its pace of seizing territory has slowed markedly.
These losses come on top of already fragile demographics. According to Rosstat, births fell to 1.222 million in 2024, the lowest since 1999, and natural population decline reached 596,000; the total fertility rate dropped below 1.4 in 2025. Rosstat’s pessimistic scenario sees the population falling to 130 million by 2046. The young and skilled people who left after the 2022 mobilization add to the picture, and part of that wave settled in Istanbul and Antalya. Rosstat’s decision to stop publishing some population data from 2025 says something about the direction of the trend as well.
From the 2018 peak to today
The last decade is enough to measure Russia’s influence abroad. Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, the Syria intervention in 2015: each move seemed to earn Moscow more than it cost. In 2018 Russia had its widest sphere of influence of the post-Soviet era; Assad was secure in Damascus, Wagner was expanding across Africa and Armenia was under Moscow’s security umbrella. 2022 is when that curve broke. After Prigozhin’s death in August 2023, Wagner was folded into the defense ministry’s “Africa Corps”. Finland joined NATO in 2023 and Sweden in 2024, adding 1,340 kilometers to Russia’s land border with the alliance. The Assad regime fell in December 2024; under a memorandum signed by Damascus and Moscow on August 9, 2026, Hmeimim and Tartus became “joint training centers” and control of civilian facilities passed to Syria. Armenia’s westward turn and the growing weight of the Azerbaijan–Türkiye axis in the South Caucasus belong to the same picture. In Central Asia the real competitor is not the West but China: the Belt and Road Initiative was announced in Kazakhstan in 2013, and Chinese capital has become decisive in the region’s infrastructure projects.
Where the “not finished” camp is right
The counter-argument is strong. Russia holds the world’s largest stockpile of nuclear warheads; even as its conventional power erodes, its strategic deterrent remains intact. Sustaining a war of almost five years as the attacking side despite heavy losses, and absorbing those losses without shaking regime stability, is something few states could do. The 2022 expectation that sanctions would collapse the Russian economy within months did not materialize; after Visa and Mastercard withdrew, Russia ran its own payment infrastructure. As the commercial value of the Northern Sea Route grows and Siberia’s energy reserves stay in place, Moscow remains, if not a superpower, an actor that shapes the balance between superpowers.
So the right question is not “Is Russia finished?” but “Which Russia is finished?” The Russia of the 2000s, integrating with Europe through energy and trade and growing at close to 7 percent a year, is gone. In its place stands a more closed, Asia-facing Russia that is still dangerous militarily but shrinking economically and demographically.
What it means for Türkiye
Türkiye built its balance in this period through the Montreux Convention: in February 2022 it closed the Turkish Straits to the warships of the belligerents under Article 19, limiting the Black Sea’s slide into a theater of bloc confrontation. Over the same period Ankara increased its weight within NATO and, after the U.S. sanctions of October 2025, reduced its purchases of Russian crude while increasing supplies from Iraq, Kazakhstan and the United States. A weaker Russia needs Ankara more; at the same time, the growing military presence in the Black Sea, the expanding NATO base in Romania and Ukraine’s naval drone attacks make Türkiye’s balancing role more valuable than ever.
Three indicators are worth watching in the coming months. The first is the Bank of Russia’s December 18 decision and whether rate cuts begin. The second is whether Russia can mass forces for a new offensive on the Kostiantynivka–Druzhkivka line. The third is who sets the price on Power of Siberia 2. That last one will give the clearest answer on whether Russia is China’s partner or its supplier.
| Indicator | Value (source) |
|---|---|
| Key rate | 14%, October 23, 2026 (Bank of Russia) |
| 2026 growth forecast | 0.5–1% (Bank of Russia) |
| 2026 inflation forecast | 7.1–7.6% (Bank of Russia) |
| Defense and security share of budget | ~38%, 16.8 trillion rubles (2026 budget) |
| Military deaths confirmed by name | ~286,000, November 6, 2026 (Mediazona) |
| Russian share of EU gas imports | 45% → 12%, 2022–2025 (European Commission) |
| Ukrainian territory under Russian control | ~19%, October 2026 (DeepState) |
| Births | 1.222 million in 2024, lowest since 1999 (Rosstat) |

