Ukraine downs $19M Russian Mi-28N helicopter with a $400 FPV drone

Ukraine’s 59th Brigade of the Unmanned Systems Forces downed a Russian Mi-28N attack helicopter worth about $19 million with a roughly $400 FPV drone.
Representative image: Russian Mi-28 attack helicopter (representative)
In an incident reported on 16 July 2026, the Russian-built Mil Mi-28N (NATO reporting name: Havoc) was struck by a Shrike 10 FPV drone made by Ukrainian firm SkyFall. The strike took place near Kotliarivka village in occupied Donetsk Oblast, about 20 kilometres from Mezhova.
The Mi-28N is an all-weather attack helicopter armed with a 30 mm cannon, missiles and rockets. A roughly $400 drone destroying a $19 million platform underscores, once again, the stark cost-effect gap in modern warfare.
At a Glance
- Date: 16 July 2026 · Place: near Kotliarivka, occupied Donetsk
- Unit: 59th Brigade (Unmanned Systems Forces)
- Target: Mil Mi-28N (Havoc) attack helicopter (~$19 million)
- Weapon: Shrike 10 FPV drone (SkyFall, ~$400)
- Oryx data: at least 45 Mi-28 and 85 Ka-52 lost/damaged since 2022
How it was downed
The 59th Brigade’s pilots coordinated the strike through intelligence work. A similar incident occurred in September 2025 using the same drone models. Moments when attack helicopters manoeuvre low and slow can open favourable windows for FPV drones.
SkyFall’s Shrike 10 is a low-cost, mass-producible platform. The spread of such systems creates a new layer against manoeuvring air targets without resorting to expensive air-defence missiles.
The bigger picture
According to Oryx tracking data, Russia has lost at least 45 Mi-28 and 85 Ka-52 helicopters as destroyed or damaged since the 2022 invasion. As attack helicopters become vulnerable to cheap drones, operating them near the front line grows increasingly risky.
The scale of drone production feeds this trend. Germany financed 50,000 FPV drones for Ukraine in a €90 million deal, while Ukraine cites a target of 20 million drones a year.
Regional and strategic meaning
Attack helicopters becoming vulnerable to cheap drones crystallises long-discussed worries about operating rotary-wing platforms near the front. When expensive, low-quantity systems like the Mi-28N are put at risk, close-air-support doctrine and how helicopters are deployed come back into question.
The picture also highlights the need for a new air-defence layer: counter-drone systems that can stop low, slow air targets without expending costly missiles. Many countries, Turkey included, accelerating laser, electronic-warfare and short-range air-defence projects are responding precisely to this low-cost threat spectrum.

