General Dynamics Guides 155 mm Artillery Beyond 50 Kilometres at Yuma

General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems says its new guidance kit steered 155 mm artillery projectiles accurately beyond 50 kilometres in a field demonstration at Yuma Proving Ground — the first U.S. guidance kit, the company says, to achieve accurate control of cannon artillery at that distance.

The logic of guidance kits

The cheapest way to make artillery precise is not to build a new shell. It is to screw a guidance kit into the fuze well of an existing one. The kit carries a satellite receiver, an inertial measurement unit and small control surfaces, converting stockpiled ammunition into precision rounds without a new production line.

The U.S. Army’s existing PGK works this way, pulling dispersion from hundreds of metres down to roughly ten. But its performance degrades as range grows. LR-PGK — the Long-Range Precision Guidance Kit — was developed to push past that ceiling.

The Yuma demonstration

The kit was fired with XM1113 rocket-assisted projectiles, a next-generation 155 mm round that uses a rocket motor to reach substantially further than conventional shells. Together, the two took accurate fire beyond 50 kilometres.

General Dynamics said accuracy in the demonstration “significantly surpassed requirements established for legacy guidance systems,” and framed the event as validating more than range: “In addition to demonstrating precision at unprecedented ranges, this test validates the performance, maturity and growth potential of the LR-PGK.” Key performance objectives for both the LR-PGK and XM1113 programmes were met.

The kit uses a modular architecture and works with several projectile types including the M1128. The company positions it to support the Army’s Mobile Tactical Cannon programme and to upgrade legacy 39-calibre cannon fleets.

Why range became the obsession

A standard 39-calibre barrel reaches around 24 kilometres; a 52-calibre barrel around 40. Ukraine showed what proliferating counter-battery radar does to that arithmetic: whoever shoots further shoots with impunity, because staying outside the enemy’s reach is the most reliable protection there is.

The U.S. Army spent years on ERCA, a 58-calibre long-barrel howitzer, before cancelling it in 2024 over barrel wear and technical difficulty. It has since turned toward munitions and mature platforms instead — the Mobile Tactical Cannon programme, moving forward with Hanwha K9-based prototypes, is a product of that shift.

That is what makes LR-PGK consequential. Buying range through the projectile rather than the barrel means existing howitzer fleets stay relevant. The investment lands on the ammunition line, not on replacing thousands of guns.

Production is the real constraint

The obstacle facing long-range guided artillery is rarely the physics. It is volume. Ukraine exposed how far NATO 155 mm output sits below the demand of a modern attritional war, and the United States is working through a phased expansion — including roughly $100 million in Army funding that recently brought new furnaces online at an Ohio steelmaker.

Guidance kits occupy an odd position in that equation. Precision reduces the number of rounds needed for an effect, easing consumption. But the kits themselves depend on electronic component supply chains and are harder to mass-produce than the shells they steer. Beyond the range record, the question is how many can be built, and at what cost.

The Turkish parallel

Turkey is working the same seam. ASELSAN has developed guidance kit solutions for 155 mm rounds, ROKETSAN produces an artillery munitions family, and MKE’s 155 mm shells serve both the Turkish Armed Forces and export customers. The T-155 Fırtına howitzer’s 52-calibre barrel already exceeds 40 kilometres with long-range ammunition.

For export markets the appeal is straightforward: for an army that cannot afford new howitzers, a guidance kit is the cheaper route to precision. Where the real test lies, for American and Turkish kits alike, is in contested electromagnetic environments where satellite signals cannot be relied on — which puts the quality of the inertial unit and jam-resistant receiver design at the centre of what comes next.