Why are Gulf countries turning to Turkey’s defense industry?
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Why are Gulf countries turning to the Turkish defense industry?
Over the past five years, Turkey has transformed from a secondary market for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries into a primary supplier. The question is no longer whether Gulf states will buy Turkish products, but what they will buy, when, and through which partnerships. In this article, we will explore the structural reasons behind this shift.
Rapid Delivery
In a defense market where delivery times are measured in months rather than years, Turkey stands out. The Bayraktar TB2 drone can be delivered within 12 to 18 months of contract signing, and missiles manufactured by Roketsan follow a similar timeline. In contrast, obtaining U.S. approval for the delivery of F-35 fighters or Patriot systems can take several years, sometimes up to a decade.
Political Flexibility
U.S. missiles and systems come with export restrictions, such as strict end-user conditions (end-user monitoring) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Turkey’s equivalent restrictions are far less stringent. This means any Persian Gulf nation can acquire Turkish drones and use them in operations that Washington might oppose.
Technology Transfer and Local Production
Qatar produces BMC’s armored vehicles in Doha. Saudi Arabia is negotiating a full technology transfer. Turkey offers a “buy and build” model: acquire the system and establish the factory. The United States is more reluctant to offer this model, while China provides it at a different price point.
Cultural and Religious Compatibility
This is a pragmatic factor. Training can be conducted in Arabic. Compared to other options, Turkish officers communicate more quickly and with less friction with their counterparts from Persian Gulf countries. This shortens the learning curve and reduces the need for intermediaries.
Combat Experience
The Bayraktar TB2 drone has proven its effectiveness in Syria, Libya, Karabakh, and Ukraine. The Atmaca anti-ship missile is also in service. This is not a marketing strategy, but real combat experience closely studied by procurement experts in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha.
Conclusion
The reasons Persian Gulf countries are turning to Turkey are simple: reasonable performance, reasonable delivery times, reasonable prices, and no complex political strings attached. This is a package that Washington does not offer; Moscow’s comes with the risk of sanctions, and Beijing’s, while cheaper, lacks political leverage.
